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1. Introduction. 
 
The decline in output and living standards in the 1990s discussed in more detail in the first 
article of this special regional volume,  pushed countries in the former Soviet bloc to re-
consider how to target public resources on the needy.  New risks to the population appeared, 
such as open unemployment. Governments lacked the resources to tackle these problems, and 
systems of support inherited from the communist period sometimes proved inappropriate or 
difficult to adapt.  In particular, social assistance schemes providing support of “last resort” 
were under-developed under communism, something associated in part with an official denial 
for many years that poverty could exist. This paper investigates a new scheme that has been 
developed in Uzbekistan, the most populous former-Soviet republic in Central Asia and one 
of the poorest republics in the Union at the end of the 1980s (Atkinson and Micklewright, 
1992, Marnie and Micklewright, 1994). 
Uzbekistan introduced a new social assistance scheme in late 1994, administered by 
traditional pre-Soviet local community groups, the “Mahallas”.  Using their local knowledge, 
these groups decide which are the most needy families in the community, and, within certain 
limits, how much support they deserve. Guidelines instruct the Mahallas on indicators of 
living standards to consider, but no rigid formula is laid down.  The system purports to tailor 
assistance more accurately to need than would alternatives and to avoid the development of 
additional state administration. Its introduction marked a clear break with the past when 
benefits were often administered by state-owned enterprises, with entitlement either being 
universal or linked to households’ formal cash income alone. About 1 in 6 households 
received benefit in 1995. 
But does benefit really go to the most needy households? Or does the flexibility of the 
scheme, the lack of formal rules of entitlement, and the control by local communities mean 
that the money often goes elsewhere? 
Section 2 describes the scheme’s details, including how the Mahallas’ expenditure is 
financed, and discusses apparent advantages and disadvantages in the design. The formal 
details, however, do not give an adequate picture of the system’s operation in practice. 
Section 3 discusses the data one would like in order to evaluate the scheme and contrasts this 
with what is available. Section 4 uses household survey data from 1995 and more limited 
data from 1999 to investigate the scheme’s success in targeting benefit towards households in 
need. Section 5 extends this with some simple multivariate analysis to show how receipt is 
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linked to various dimensions of living standards. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The Uzbek Mahallas and the social assistance scheme. 
 
The Mahalla scheme started in Autumn 1994, coinciding with the removal of food subsidies, 
and represented the first attempt in Uzbekistan to provide assistance of last resort targeted at 
the needy.  Administrative data record 21 percent of households receiving support in 1995 
but there appears to be some double counting due to repeat awards to the same households.  
The figure of about 1 in 6 households in receipt given in the Introduction makes allowance 
for this.  This level of coverage indicates widespread receipt but the level of support is 
modest.  According to the 1995 survey used later in the paper, among households receiving 
assistance the benefit accounted for only a third of total cash income received in the previous 
month. The few data we have for subsequent years indicate that the scheme has become less 
generous over time (at least up until the year at which the available data cease). 
The scheme’s operation is detailed in instructions to the Mahallas from the Ministry 
of Labour and Social Protection, which is responsible for overseeing its administration. Most 
details have remained unchanged over time and new instructions issued in 2002 essentially 
repeated those from 1994.1 We describe the key features below, but we start by giving some 
information on the nature of the Mahallas. 
 
i) The Mahallas in Uzbek society 
 
Mahallas are neighbourhood committees based around a group of elders who traditionally try 
to resolve problems and conflicts within the community and help the needy in various ways.  
Although the Mahallas are not a religious organisation, they promote traditional Islamic ideas 
on social roles and behaviour. The Mahallas have existed for centuries in the Uzbek (and 
Tajik) cultures and managed to survive the Soviet period. The relationship with the Uzbek 
state changed notably following the break-up of the USSR with the government progressively 
incorporating the Mahallas into the state system – in many ways they now compensate for the 
loss of the communist party network.  The chairman and secretary of each Mahalla are paid a 
salary by the local authorities and candidates for Mahalla chairman have to be approved by 
                                            
1 Since 1997 child benefits have also been targeted through the Mahallas, and a separate set 
of instructions were issued in 1997 and 2002 to regulate allocation of this benefit. 
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local government offices. The committee deciding on requests for benefit contains state 
officials (described below). 
There are about 12,000 Mahallas in Uzbekistan, with the number of households in 
each Mahalla area ranging from around 150 to 1,500, and averaging only about 400.2  The 
chairman and committee members are in principle elected by the local population.  There 
have been claims, however, that in the majority of instances, the members are simply 
appointed by the elders of the Mahalla, and that women very rarely participate in the 
committee (Poliakov, 1992: 77).3 However, as in the previous communist party system, there 
is usually a Women’s Committee within each Mahalla, to which women can turn with their 
concerns. In 2004 a new paid post restricted to women was created within each Mahalla as 
part of a presidential decree on women; the participation of women in recent protest 
movements in Uzbekistan has led to a concern to increase the social control function of the 
Mahallas. 
 
ii) Financing 
 
A key issue in a decentralized benefit system is the origin of funds used by the local bodies 
charged with allocating benefit. The Mahallas receive funds for social assistance almost 
entirely from central government.  Funds are distributed by the Ministry of Finance through 
oblast (region) and raion (sub-region) offices.  Once annual funds are allocated, no further 
money is available.  Each Mahalla allocates assistance to households in the form of a 
monthly cash transfer granted for three months (renewable) which should be between 1.5 and 
3 times the minimum wage. 
Unfortunately, the criteria for allocating funding are unclear. Funds are said to have 
initially been distributed to each Mahalla according to the number of resident households, 
reflecting an intention to target the poorest families within each Mahalla, and not the poorest 
in the country as a whole. On this basis, the Mahallas in the richest areas should receive the 
same funding per resident family as those in the poorest.  In practice the oblast or raion 
                                            
2 Many Mahallas were in fact created in the 1990s, particularly in large urban areas where 
they have taken over from the domkom or “housing committee” of big appartment blocks. 
These Mahallas therefore lack any inheritance of a role based on traditional Uzbek culture. 
Mahallas are also a new feature in the autonomous republic of Karakalpakstan, one of the 
three regions covered in our survey data. 
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offices of the Ministry of Finance can apparently re-distribute funds between Mahallas but 
we don’t know how often this happens or the amounts involved. (Griffin (1995: 152) reports 
on an example.)  Since 1995, central funds are said to have been allocated according to the 
number of families receiving assistance in the previous year, but we are unsure what happens 
in practice. 
 
iii) Claim and award 
 
Households have to make a written application to their Mahalla or be recommended by the 
chairman of the Mahalla on his own initiative.  A committee, comprising of “the most 
respected citizens”, advisors to the Mahalla chairman, and representatives from local offices 
of the Ministry of Labour, the Tax Inspectorate, and the Ministry of Finance then decides 
whether a household should qualify for assistance, and, if so, the amount to be allocated.  
This process includes a visit to the applicant’s home. A report is compiled on the household 
composition, the employment status of members, income and assets, and access to and use of 
private agricultural plots.  Following the committee’s recommendation, a decision is taken at 
the next plenary session of the Mahalla, and the grounds for eligibility or refusal recorded in 
a special register. 
The Ministry of Labour issues instructions to the Mahalla committees on how to 
identify needy households.4  Assistance should be given to: 
 
“households without the possibility to significantly increase their income by 
increasing the economic activity of household members... Material assistance is [to 
be] given mainly to large households with many children, households of the 
unemployed, households in which the main bread winner is an invalid, who has 
fully or partly lost the ability to work, households who have lost their breadwinner, 
and pensioners living alone.” 
 
However, the instructions go on to state that benefit can go to any household which “has 
sound reasons for receiving it”.  
                                                                                                                                        
3 One observer described to us that the traditional centre of the Mahalla was the chaihona, or 
tea-house, which is not noted for the presence of women. 
4  The quotations that follow are our translation from the Russian original. 
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 Guidelines are given for assessment of need; some information must be 
considered:  
 
“the composition of the household; the income received in the preceding month; an 
estimate of the household’s assets; the size of the agricultural plot and an 
evaluation of the possibility of receiving income from it.” 
 
The instructions also specify that: 
 
“In determining the assets of the family, the commission should look at expensive 
items, which are not vital for normal everyday survival of the family... e.g. a car, 
dacha plot, or other luxury items.” 
 
As far as land is concerned (e.g. the household plot), the Mahalla must take into account 
the potential income obtained from land in the locality – with guidance that 100 square 
metres should generate monthly income at least as great as the minimum wage. 
 As these details indicate, the scheme contains firm guidelines and a considerable degree 
of formality.  But there is much discretion: there are no circumstances stipulated in which 
committees must award benefit. Indeed, the instructions from the Ministry of Labour note 
that committees have the right to "independently determine principles and criteria" for 
awards. 
 
iv) Appraising the scheme's design 
 
The Mahalla scheme has several apparent advantages. 
 
A1. Local knowledge of household circumstances is exploited that would be difficult to cover 
in a centrally codified system.  This reduces households’ incentive to conceal their true 
circumstances.  The discretion given to the Mahallas allows communities’ preferences to 
be reflected in the scheme’s administration. By using what is formally a non-
governmental organisation, the scheme should entail lower administrative costs for the 
state budget. 
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A2. Administration through community organisations should increase the diffusion of 
information and acceptance of the scheme’s principles, increasing take-up from the 
needy and discouraging frivolous applications.  Moreover, the Mahalla chairman can 
initiate an appraisal of eligibility without a household submitting a claim (or being aware 
of the scheme). 
 
A3. Several aspects of living standards are considered. This is important in an economy 
where assessment and verification of cash income is made harder than before by greater 
self-employment and fewer formal controls on economic activity.  Income in kind is 
included; agricultural production on a household's land, a notable source of income 
throughout Central Asia, is taken explicitly into account. 
 
A4. There is an emphasis on the dynamics of poverty alleviation – help is to given to those 
households who "cannot significantly increase their income" rather than to just poor 
households per se. Awards are made only for three months and then a claim must be 
made. 
 
To set against these features, several obvious disadvantages exist. 
 
D1. Discretion means that subjectivity and arbitrariness of a negative kind can enter.  The 
procedures could result in discrimination against ethnic or religious minorities, either 
reflecting majority preferences within the community or resulting from abuse of power 
by Mahalla officials. Administrative skills in applying the rules may vary widely, 
especially given the small sizes of many Mahallas. The lack of any appeal mechanism 
against decisions will aggravate these problems. 
 
D2. The allocation of funds apparently takes little account of average living standards in each 
community and hence differences in the demand for benefit.  If households’ needs for 
support are judged against a common national living standard, the allocation system must 
result in some needy households failing to receive and some prosperous households 
obtaining benefit.  This is an obvious concern unless one accepts a focus on reduction of 
differences in living standards solely within Mahallas.  That focus is inappropriate as a 
principal aim for a national social assistance scheme. 
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 D3. Administration costs to the state are not negligible.  State employees participate in the 
committees investigating claims and the chairman and secretary of each Mahalla have 
their salaries paid by the state (although their functions run beyond the administration of 
the social assistance scheme). Monitoring costs are increased by the very large numbers 
of Mahallas. 
 
D4. The public nature of application and award can have negative effects on claims.  
Financial and psychic costs of take-up may lead some needy households not to apply. 
This is true of any means-tested benefit, but the administration of social assistance in 
Uzbekistan by an organization with its roots in traditional culture can be expected to 
worsen the problem for some households just as it may ameliorate it for others.  Slav and 
other households not of Central Asian ethnicity – an important minority in large urban 
areas – may have a much less positive attitude to the Mahallas.  Even among ethnic 
Uzbeks, attitudes to the Mahalla may vary.5 
 
The apparent advantages and disadvantages of the scheme imply that benefit could be well 
targeted or poorly targeted, depending on the balance between the two.  Empirical 
investigation of what happens in practice is needed. 
 
3. Data Needs and Availability 
 
Two sources of data are required to assess the operation of the scheme: administrative 
records and household surveys. 
 Administrative records could reveal a lot: numbers of claims and awards, the importance 
of different reasons for rejecting claims, levels of benefit and total expenditure. 
Administrative data would show how all these features have evolved over time. They would 
document geographical variation in the scheme’s operation. Are benefit payments more 
                                            
5 Poliakov presents a view of the Mahallas that one can imagine discouraging take-up among 
less traditionally inclined households; “each Mahalla committee regulates the entire social 
and personal life of its territory. It shapes public opinion, policing observation of norms of 
behaviour derived from Sharia, Abat and local pratices” (1992: 77-78). However, it has also 
to be noted that the character and role of the Mahalla committees have been changing since 
the beginning of the 1990s. 
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common in some parts of the country than others; and how does this relate to geographical 
variation in living standards and, critically, the allocation of funds to the Mahallas? Although 
rules for allocating funds seem unclear, Ministry of Finance records must show what happens 
in practice. 
 Unfortunately, almost none of this information is available and any analyses within 
government are not in the public domain. If anything, less has been made available over time, 
reflecting increasing controls exerted by the state over many aspects of data and information. 
Some limited data ending in 1998 are shown in Table 1, indicating a scheme that was 
declining in importance. Expenditure on benefit in 1998 was half what it was in 1995, the 
first full year of operation, a reduction reflected in the fall in average benefit payment. 
 Even if they were readily available and well used, administrative records would not be 
sufficient. They do not allow comparison of circumstances of households with benefit and 
those without. For this we need household survey data that record both the living standards of 
households and whether they are receiving social assistance or not. 
 Uzbekistan, like other republics of the former USSR, has a long history of collecting 
survey data. But the official household survey inherited from the Soviet period had many 
weaknesses.  The Soviet Family Budget Survey (FBS) had ‘a long history and a terrible 
reputation’ (Falkingham and Micklewright 1997: 48).6 The FBS was a quota survey of 
households of workers in the state sector, on collective farms, and pensioners, with the quotas 
tending to over-represent industry and construction.  The extensive investigation of the 
survey by Shenfield (1983) concluded that it was ‘highly unrepresentative of the population 
as a whole’ (p.3).  
 There was also very limited experience of analysis of the data within the Soviet republics. 
FBS data were collected by each republic’s statistical office and sent to Moscow. The Uzbek 
office, for example, was able to undertake only a few pre-determined analyses of the data 
with the computer hardware and software at its disposal. Anything out of the ordinary 
required manual computation and involved going back to the completed questionnaires. The 
problem was not just one of technical capacity. There was no ‘social science’ tradition of 
inquiry into targeting of resources or alleviation of need. 
 These twin problems of inadequate data and lack of analytic capacity and tradition 
persisted throughout the 1990s. The Uzbek part of the FBS contained some 3000 households 
                                            
6 See also Atkinson and Micklewright (1992). 
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at the end of the 1980s and was expanded to 4250 households shortly after independence, 
with new quotas for each branch of the economy in an effort to increase its 
representativeness. But essentially the survey went on as before with, for example, no 
changes to the questionnaire or the systems in place to analyse the data. 
 In 2000, however, a new household budget survey was launched by the Uzbek statistical 
office with technical support from the German overseas aid agency, GTZ, and the World 
Bank. This has a modern probability design and should collect data that are representative of 
the Uzbek population. Moreover, it includes questions specifically on the Mahalla scheme: 
whether a household knows about the scheme, whether it has claimed benefit, whether 
benefit was granted and the amount in receipt, the reasons given for any rejection of a claim, 
and whether a household would apply for benefit if in need. 
 The new survey collects data each year that could be used to investigate many aspects of 
the scheme’s operation. Unfortunately, the second problem inherited from the Soviet era 
continues: little analytic capacity and tradition. This is compounded by the government’s 
reluctance to publish data or to undertake any self-critical analysis of its policies. In short, the 
information in the new survey, which represents an enormous step forward, is largely going 
to waste.7
 In this situation we use other sources to say what we can. The first is a household survey 
we conducted with Uzbek counterparts in 1995. The European University Institute and 
University of Essex Survey in Uzbekistan (EESU) was a survey of nearly 1,600 households 
in three regions in June 1995, nine months after the Mahalla scheme was introduced.  These 
regions – Tashkent city (the capital), Fergana and Karakalpakstan – represent different levels 
of average living standards.  Most indicators show household welfare in Tashkent city (with 
over 2 million people) as higher than elsewhere, with Fergana (an agricultural region with 
some large urban areas) in the middle of the spectrum (Coudouel et al 1997). Karakalpakstan 
is considered one of Uzbekistan’s poorest regions. The sample consists of about 500 
households in each region, designed to be representative at the regional level with the sample 
drawn with a conventional probability design.8
 The survey instrument contained a module on the Mahalla scheme, addressed to the head 
                                            
7 The data from the new survey for 2000 were used in a World Bank assessment of poverty in 
Uzbekistan in 2002-3. 
8 Our national level results employ weights designed to produce a sample representative of 
the total population of the three surveyed regions.  We thus weight by region and also correct 
for some under-sampling in rural areas.  (See Coudouel (1998) for details.) 
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of the household – essentially the same questions now contained in the new budget survey.  
The household questionnaire also contained sections on household composition, housing and 
ownership of durable goods, and access to and use of agricultural plots.  A questionnaire to 
all adults aged over 16 collected information on education, employment and incomes.  Basic 
anthropometry (height and weight) were collected from all pre-school children, representing 
an important additional measure of living standards (Ismail and Micklewright 2001).  The 
survey therefore provides various welfare indicators.  Unfortunately, we were unable to 
supplement the data with any information on the Mahallas in which respondent households 
reside, such as the funds allocated for social assistance expenditure. 
 The second source is a survey of just over 500 households carried out in Fergana in 
February 1999, again with a conventional probability design. This was a pilot for the new 
official budget survey. Definitions vary slightly from our 1995 survey, but the modules in the 
two surveys’ questionnaires on the social assistance scheme are identical. Although limited to 
one region, we can compare the picture of targeting at two points in time, shortly after the 
start of the scheme and four years later. 
 
4.  A first look at targeting 
 
Figure 1 classifies households in the 1995 survey by their knowledge, claim history, receipt, 
and attitude towards the social assistance scheme.  Four-fifths of households knew of the 
scheme and among these about a third had applied for assistance. Two-thirds of applicants 
were granted help – award was therefore far from automatic – and a small number of those 
not applying were granted benefit on the Mahalla committee's initiative – confirming this as a 
real possibility.  Nearly 1 in 5 households were receiving benefit or had previously done so.  
The latter group is not negligible; about a fifth of those awarded benefit were no longer in 
receipt when interviewed, implying an annual outflow rate from benefit of about 25 percent, 
demonstrating a reasonable degree of turnover in the pool of beneficiaries. 
Among those who had not applied, over half said they would do so if they were in 
“material difficulties”.  The attitude of persons aware of the scheme seems rather positive – 
those who applied, who say they would apply, or who had accepted help represent over 70 
percent of all households with knowledge of the scheme.  But 40 percent of the full sample 
either had not heard of the scheme, or say they would not apply to it if in difficulty.  The size 
of this group suggests that a significant take-up problem exists. 
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 Table 2 shows knowledge of the scheme and incidence of receipt in each of the three 
included regions, distinguishing also between urban and rural areas.  Both knowledge and 
receipt are more common in Fergana and Karakalpakstan and, within those two regions, in 
rural areas. The higher incidence of receipt in rural areas is particularly notable – twice that 
in towns and cities. 
 Table 3 is restricted to Fergana. It compares the situation in 1995 with that in 1999 
when our data cover only this region. It shows how receipt varies with household income in 
1995 and with household expenditure in 1999 (when comprehensive income data were not 
collected). In both years the amounts of any social assistance from the Mahalla are deducted 
from the figures since we wish to see how the benefit is targeted across the distribution of 
income or expenditure prior to the Mahallas’ support. Figures are adjusted by the per capita 
equivalence scale in order to take into account differences in household size. (Figures for the 
three regions in the 1995 survey taken together are in fact quite similar to those for Fergana 
alone.) 
 Benefit coverage in 1995 falls from between a quarter and a third of households in the 
bottom two quintile groups to 1 in 7 in the highest.  This is a reasonably steep (and 
encouraging) decline. How does it arise – through falling knowledge, fewer claims or a lower 
probability of benefit being awarded?  Knowledge of the scheme is high and shows very little 
variation with income (column 2), although about 1 in 10 households in the lower part of the 
income distribution are ignorant of the scheme.  Only half those knowing about the scheme 
and in the poorest fifth had applied (column 3). But claims for benefit among those with 
knowledge fall sharply with income; households in the bottom 40 percent were about twice 
as likely to have applied for assistance than households in the top 40 percent. The last column 
shows that given a claim is made, a rich household is broadly speaking as likely to get benefit 
as a poor household. It is the poorer households’ greater propensity to apply for benefit that 
leads to a greater proportion of them being in receipt.9 This shows there is a considerable 
element of ‘self-targeting’ present in the scheme. 
 Targeting in 1995 seems not unreasonable. The lower half of the table shows the 
situation in 1999.  Several features stand out. First, the data show fewer households in 
receipt, reflecting the decreasing coverage shown in administrative records for the whole 
                                            
9  The table does not show how average benefit paid to recipients changes across the income 
distribution. There is in fact very little change, which means that the shares of total benefit 
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country in Table 1. Second, the fall in the probability of receipt in 1999 as expenditure rises 
is similar to the fall with rising income in 1995, once the overall decline in coverage is taken 
into account: households in the poorest 40 percent are again about twice as likely to have 
benefit as those in the richest 40 percent. Second, knowledge is slightly higher in 1999 but 
still not universal. Third, surprisingly the frequency of claims had not increased much from 
1995. (NB households in the two surveys are not the same ones – the data are two separate 
cross-sections.) And fourth, the number of claiming households awarded benefit was sharply 
down, from 72 percent to 44 percent. The Mahallas appear to have reacted to the reduction in 
funds by reducing the number of awards they make. But the main reason for the difference in 
probability of benefit between poor and rich households remains that the latter are less likely 
to make claims. 
  
4. Linking receipt to various measures of living standards 
 
Cash income over one month, the period for which our 1995 survey collected income data, is 
not a very strong indicator of household living standards in a country such as Uzbekistan. 
Household expenditure, collected in the 1999 survey of Fergana, is probably a better 
indicator, but this again measures just one dimension of well-being. And neither income nor 
expenditure will be perfectly recorded.  In this section we relate benefit receipt in the 1995 
survey to a range of household characteristics that should be related to living standards. 
 These characteristics both proxy income unobserved in the survey and directly reflect 
household well-being in their own right.  Some are explicitly mentioned in the guidance 
given to the Mahallas on the assessment of need, e.g. number of children and the 
unemployed.  Besides monthly cash income (minus any social assistance in payment), they 
are an index of durable good ownership, whether the household owns a means of motorised 
transport (car or motorbike), whether it owns land (or has a household plot), whether it owns 
livestock (cattle, sheep or goats), whether the household is headed by a woman, whether 
there is anyone unemployed in the household, the total number of children in the household, 
and the anthropometric status of young children (whether any children are ‘stunted’, i.e. low 
height given their age). 
 Rather than looking at the association of these variables, one by one, with receipt of 
                                                                                                                                        
expenditure going to each income group correspond closely to the percentages of household 
in receipt. 
 13
benefit, we analyse the probability that a household receives benefit as a function of all the 
variables taken together. To do this we use logistic regression, in which the probability of 
receipt of benefit for a household, P, is given by the function 1/[1+exp(ßX)] where X is a set 
of variables that we measure for each household and ß are their coefficients to be estimated. 
These coefficents show the impact of each variable, holding other variables constant. Given 
the mathematical form of the logistic regression function, the marginal impact of any variable 
Xm on the probability P is given by P.(1–P).βm where βm is the coefficient of Xm. This takes 
its highest value when P equals 0.5. At this point, the marginal impact of a variable is found 
by dividing its coefficient by four (i.e. multiplying by 0.5.(1– 0.5) = 0.25). For example, if a 
coefficient is 0.4, this means that the variable in question changes the predicted probability of 
receipt by up to 10 percentage points. 
 Besides variables designed to measure living standards, we also include variables that 
are intended to assess whether there are unequal outcomes for households with similar living 
standards, i.e. to measure ‘horizontal inequity’. A just social assistance scheme should result 
in no variation of receipt with characteristics such as locality or ethnic group, so long as we 
control for households’ living standards with the variables listed above.  We test for such 
variation with several crude measures of geographic location and a variable measuring 
ethnicity: dummy variables for Karakalpakstan and Fergana (the base is Tashkent), for towns 
(urban areas below 100,000 people) and for rural areas, and for households headed by 
someone of Central Asian ethnicity. The allocation of funds to Mahallas may favour different 
parts of the country. The scheme’s operation may be more generous in the countryside where 
monitoring may be harder.  The nature of the Mahallas may increase take-up from the 
majority Central Asian ethnic groups. (Central Asian ethnicity is almost universal in 
Karakalpakstan but nearly 1 in 10 households in Fergana and a half in Tashkent are of 
another background, typically Slav.) Of course, all these indicators may partly proxy 
household living standards that are not measured in the data, some of which at least can be 
observed by the Mahalla committees investigating claims to benefit. One of the purposes of 
decentralised social assistance is that the local authorities responsible for delivery should take 
locally-available information into account.  For example, there may be greater need in rural 
areas for support, not all of which we can measure with other variables.  However, it is 
unlikely that all the association found between receipt and the ‘horizontal equity’ variables is 
explained by their correlation with aspects of well-being not recorded in our survey. 
 The results in Table 4 contain some surprises. The first variable, income is completely 
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insignificant. The strong association of income with receipt shown earlier in Table 3 appears 
to reflect the correlation of income with other factors. Key among these is ownership of 
durable goods, something that is easily assessed by the Mahalla when visiting claimants. The 
index of durable goods (that ranges in value from 0 to 1) and the dummy variable for 
ownership of transport both have powerful negative and significant effects on the probability 
of the household receiving benefit.  Evaluating at the average probability of receipt, the 
marginal effect of one additional durable good is to reduce that probability by some 5 percent 
points.  Ownership of transport reduces the probability by up to 15 points.  The plot and 
livestock variables measure agricultural assets.  Surprisingly, ownership of a plot has a 
positive effect on receipt, similar in absolute magnitude to that of transport ownership.  
Ownership of livestock has no discernible association with benefit, other things equal. There 
appears to be no simple picture of greater agricultural assets being associated with a lower 
probability of receipt (controlling for other factors). Finally, benefit is much more likely with 
more children in the household, in female-headed households, and in households with 
unemployed persons. If the head is a woman, the household is up to 30 percent points more 
likely to get assistance after other factors are taken into account.  The presence of a stunted 
child in the house is however a ‘dog that does not bark’ – the variable has no significant 
effect.  Some 15 percent of children aged 0-6 in the sample are moderately or severely 
stunted – height-for-age more than two standard deviations below the standard international 
benchmark for their age. The simple correlation in the data of receipt with stunting is positive 
(Micklewright and Ismail 2001). However, this association is not present when other 
variables are controlled for. 
 What of the ‘horizontal equity’ variables? Benefit is substantially more likely in 
Karakalpakstan than in the capital Tashkent (the base category), but not in Fergana. It is also 
more likely in rural areas. The pattern of incidence across the three regions in Table 2 is 
clearly therefore not just the result of differences across the country in levels of living 
standards measured by income, durable assets or other included variables since these 
variables are controlled for in the logistic regression model.  Benefit is somewhat less likely 
in towns than in the base of large cities. Central Asian households are up to 15 percentage 
points more likely to get benefit. 
 Overall, the results provide mixed evidence on the degree of targeting.  Most 
variables that are proxies for unobserved income or are indicators of living standards in their 
own right, have the expected sign.  But cash income is insignificant.  The variables intended 
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to test for horizontal inequity give results that are not encouraging: controlling for other 
characteristics, locality and ethnicity make a sizeable difference, although part of this may 
proxy differences in living standards between households that are not observed in the data. 
 We can summarise the overall picture by using the results to calculate predicted 
probabilities of benefit for two hypothetical households, one with characteristics implying 
low living standards, i.e. a ‘poor’ household, and one with the opposite, i.e. a ‘rich’ 
household.  The ‘poor’ household has income at the 10th percentile, has no durable goods, no 
transport, no livestock (or plot), four children and at least one unemployed member. The 
‘rich’ household has income at the 90th percentile, has 5 durable goods, a means of transport, 
livestock (and a plot), and no children or unemployed member. Other characteristics are fixed 
at their mean values for both types of household (including the variables intended to measure 
horizontal inequity). 
 The poor household has a predicted probability of receipt of 0.32 while that for the 
rich household is only 0.02.  On the one hand this is a satisfactory picture for two reasons. 
First, there is a huge difference in the probabilities of receipt between the two types of 
household. Second, the rich household’s probability is practically zero. On the other hand, 
the poor household’s predicted probability of getting support is not that high, being well short 
of even 0.5. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The social assistance scheme administered by the Mahallas in Uzbekistan provides an 
interesting example of a highly decentralized and flexible system of targeting.10 The 
scheme’s rules embody no formal set of necessary or sufficient conditions for benefit.  But it 
delivers benefit much more frequently to the less well-off than to the better-off, as 
summarized by our predictions for rich and poor households.  In this sense, the results are a 
positive demonstration of the potential for flexible community-based schemes of social 
assistance. And much of the targeting seems to come through richer households correctly 
recognising that the scheme is not for them – the probability of making a claim falls sharply 
with income level. 
                                            
10 We have not discussed the extension of the Mahallas’ administration of benefits to the 
targeting of child benefits and maternity benefits, from 1997 and 1999 respectively (see 
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 However, some less satisfactory results also emerge from the survey data, a reminder 
of the drawbacks of informality and flexibility in system design.  First, holding constant 
measures of living standards, households in certain parts of the country and those of Central 
Asian ethnicity are more likely to benefit. Second, the probability of getting benefit is not 
that high even for poor households. 
 A part of both the success and failure in targeting probably stems from the nature of 
the Mahalla as an institution in Uzbek society.  This may have helped the benefit scheme be 
accepted locally as a poverty alleviation programme, promoting the ‘self-targeting’ alluded to 
above. But it may have hindered knowledge of the scheme among Slav households.  The 
increasing influence exerted by the Uzbek state over the Mahallas since the scheme’s 
inception should have reduced any arbitrary exercise of local power but it is also likely to 
have reduced any positive aspects of genuine community autonomy. The limited evidence 
from the 1995 and 1999 comparisons suggests that the degree of targeting on the poor was 
roughly constant over this period. We have stressed that the necessary household survey data 
to monitor the scheme’s current performance and its changes from year to year do now exist. 
But they need much more use both inside and outside government. 
 A key issue in design of decentralised benefit systems is the provision of the 
necessary funds to the responsible institutions. All Central Asian countries have faced the 
problem of decentralising some responsibility for functions of the state but at the same time 
providing adequate and transparent funding so as to ensure that need is met.  The Uzbek 
scheme seems far from ideal in this respect. Lack of data again mean that we have been 
unable to shed sufficient light on the subject. But more attention to the appropriate provision 
of funds to different Mahallas might have as much or more effect on targeting as any further 
monitoring by the central authorities of the Mahallas’ decisions on the allocation of the funds 
at their disposal. 
 Other countries in Central Asia – and elsewhere – may look to the Uzbek scheme as a 
model for possible adoption (assuming that suitable local community groups to administer 
such a scheme could be identified). Our analysis shows that caution would be needed, with a 
clear understanding of the drawbacks as well as the attractions. 
                                                                                                                                        
Coudouel and Marnie 1999). Many of the issues discussed in this paper also apply to those 
schemes. 
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Figure 1: Knowledge, claims, awards, and attitudes to social assistance 
 
 
 
Knowledge  
 
Application by the household
Decision of the Mahalla Committee
(64%) (25%) (11%)
[2%]
Allocated 
help (4%)
Not allocated  
help (96%) 
Yes [80%] No [20%] 
NoYes (31%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Household’s attitude towards the scheme
Would 
apply  
[29%]
Would 
not apply 
[22%] 
(42%)(54%) (4%)
Don’t 
know  
[2%] 
 
Receiving 
now  
[13%] 
Refused  
[6%] 
(78%) (22%) 
No longer 
receiving  
[3%] 
Granted Waiting
[3%] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Figures in square brackets give the percentage of the total sample in each group.  The 
figures in round brackets show the percentage at each stage. Weights are applied for both 
urban/rural sampling and for oblast sample size. 
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Table 1. Social assistance payments and expenditure, 1995-98 
 
 1995 1996 1997 1998
% of households with benefit 21 15 17 n.a. 
Av. benefit as % of av. wage 24 24 19 16 
Av. benefit as % of av. pension 59 61 55 43 
Total expenditure as a % of state 
budget 
1.9 2.2 0.8 0.8 
 
Source: unpublished data from administrative records. 
 
 
Table 2: Knowledge, claim and incidence of benefit, 1995 
 
 Tashkent Fergana Karakalpakstan 
 city Urban rural urban rural 
Knowledge (% knowing the 
scheme) 
69.9 80.6 89.5 86.1 94.2 
Incidence (% receiving benefit) 10.5 13.1 27.6 18.9 36.4 
      
Sample size 
 
552 191 280 333 225 
 
Note. Households no longer receiving benefit are included among recipients in this table. 
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Table 3:  Receipt, knowledge, claim and award by household income: Fergana 1995 and 
1999 
 
 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 
Income 
quintile 
group  
Benefit 
received 
(%) 
Know 
of the 
scheme 
(%) 
Claimed 
(among 
those with 
knowledge)
(%) 
Awarded 
(among 
those who 
claimed) 
(%) 
1 (poorest) 27 87 48 65 
2 33 89 44 82 
3 15 87 24 74 
4 12 88 21 64 
5 (richest) 14 84 25 67 
     
All hshlds. 21 87 33 72 
 
 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 
Expenditure 
quintile 
group  
Benefit 
received 
(%) 
Know 
of the 
scheme 
(%) 
Claimed 
(among 
those with 
knowledge)
(%) 
Awarded 
(among 
those who 
claimed) 
(%) 
1 (poorest) 17 94 48 64 
2 19 92 42 73 
3 16 93 33 69 
4 11 88 28 76 
5 (richest) 8 92 24 67 
     
All hshlds. 14 91 35 72 
 
Note. Households no longer receiving benefit are included among recipients in column 3.  
Income in 1995 is that received in cash in the previous month (excluding income due but not 
received) and excludes any social assistance received from the Mahalla. Social assistance 
from the Mahalla is also deducted from the 1999 expenditure figures (expenditure is that in 
the previous month). Both income and expenditure are equivalised for differences in 
household size by the per capita scale (which embodies an elasticity of household needs with 
respect to household size of 1.0). 
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Table 4: Logistic regression of the probability of receipt of social assistance 
 
 coeff. p 
value 
Welfare variables 
  Income (log) –0.04 0.72
  Durable good index –1.44 0.00
  Own transport –0.63 0.00
  Own plot of land 0.51 0.03
  Own livestock –0.44 0.02
  Children (number) 0.21 0.00
  Stunted child present 0.06 0.78
  Female head 1.17 0.00
  Unemployed persons present 0.43 0.02
Horizontal equity variables 
  Fergana 0.21 0.48
  Karakalpakstan 0.67 0.03
  Town –0.46 0.12
  Rural area 0.57 0.04
  Central Asian ethnicity 0.66 0.04
 
  Constant –2.93 0.00
  Sample size    1,581 
  Psuedo-R2   0.15 
 
Note. Income is that in cash, received or due from all sources in last month (excluding any 
income from the Mahalla) and is equivalised using the Uzbek Ministry of Labour scale, 
which approximates an elasticity of needs with respect to size of 0.7.  The durable good index 
is defined as follows: for each of 5 durable goods (fridge, colour TV, washing machine, tape 
recorder, sewing mchaine) a household scored “1” if the good is present; the total is then 
summed and divided by 5 (the index therefore ranges from 0 to 1.) 
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